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Childcare Leave: Unequal Treatment in the
European Economic Community
J. Kevin Millst
May Member States in the European Community ("EC" or
"Community") grant childcare leave1 to mothers but not to fa-
thers? The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has held in two
cases that childcare leave discrimination is not sex discrimination.2
Benefits programs that make childcare leave available only to
mothers are valid under the Equal Treatment Directive ("ETD"),s
which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of gen-
der, marriage, or family status.' In two decisions the ECJ found
male-excluding policies valid under an express exception to the
ETD: the protection of women in connection with pregnancy and
maternity.5 This Comment examines these decisions and concludes
that they may ultimately impede, rather than advance, the Euro-
pean drive for sexual equality in the workplace.
Part I of this Comment compares employee childcare benefits
in the EC and the United States. This comparison suggests that
European nations may be more strongly committed to using child-
care benefits to improve sexual equality than their United States
counterpart. Part II compares the ETD to the United States' Preg-
t A.B. 1989, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Chicago.
As used in this Comment, leave taken by the mother while she is actually disabled on
account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is pregnancy disability or
childbearing leave. Leave taken during other periods, traditionally for infant care, is child-
care or parental leave.
' See Case 163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, 1983
ECR 3273; Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR 3047, 1986:1
CMLR 242.
' Council Dir 76/207, 1976 OJ L39:40.
' Id. Article 1(1) implements the principle of equal treatment in the Member States
with respect to access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working con-
ditions. Under article 2(1), the principle of equal treatment means "that there shall be no
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in
particular to marital or family status."
I Id, art 2(3), 1976 OJ at L39:40. The ETD's general prohibition against employment
discrimination on the grounds of gender contains several express exceptions, including the
protection of women. Article 2(3) provides, "[t]his directive shall be without prejudice to
provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and
maternity."
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nancy Discrimination Act ("PDA")' and discusses the different
philosophies underlying each. Part III examines feminist solutions
to the maternity/workplace dilemma. This part recommends ad-
herence to the Equal Treatment Model of sexual equality. Finally,
Part IV compares American and European judicial solutions to the
childcare leave question. This Comment concludes that the Ameri-
can solution, which mandates equal childcare leave for mothers
and fathers, better serves the interests of women and better fulfills
the EC's commitment to achieving sexual equality.
I. EMPLOYEE CHILDCARE BENEFITS IN THE EC AND IN THE U.S.
In general, European workers enjoy far more job and income
security than workers in the United States.' In addition to almost
universal health insurance coverage, most Member States also
grant female employees fourteen weeks of paid maternity leave.8
Most of these countries have extended their disability leave peri-
ods to accommodate infant care and to foster parent-child bond-
ing.' In the United States, however, to the extent that women re-
ceive childcare benefits at all, receipt of such benefits is
conditioned solely on a woman's physical disability.1" Few em-
6 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 USC §§ 2000e-2 (1988), is the U.S.
counterpart to the "protection of women" exception contained in the EC's Equal Treatment
Directive.
Sheila B. Kamerman, Maternity and Parenting Benefits: An International Overview,
in Edward F. Zigler and Meryl Frank, eds, The Parental Leave Crisis 235 (Yale U Press,
1988). The various maternity and parental leave and income replacement policies can be
broken down into four overlapping domains:
(1) social-insurance related measures to protect income lost before or after child-
birth; (2) measures to protect the health of the pregnant woman and of the
mother, immediately before and after childbirth; (3) measures to protect women
against job loss and related benefits at the time of pregnancy and childbirth; and
(4) measures intended to facilitate the development of wholesome parent-child
attachment.
Note, Childbearing and Childrearing: Feminists and Reform, 73 Va L Rev 1145, 1147 n 17
(1987). In all four domains, workers in Europe generally enjoy far greater benefits than
workers in the United States. Id at 1147.
" Id at 1150 (such policies typically provide eight weeks of paid leave immediately fol-
lowing childbirth).
' See Kamerman, Maternity and Parenting Benefits: An International Overview at
241-43 (cited in note 7).
10 Mary Piccirillo, The Legal Background of a Parental Leave Policy and Its Implica-
tions, in Edward F. Zigler and Meryl Frank, eds, The Parental Leave Crisis 293, 303 (Yale
U Press, 1988).
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ployer policies base leave policies on encouraging the development
of parent-child relationships.11
Not only are benefits more widely available in Europe, but
employers are also required to provide them as a matter of na-
tional law. 2 By contrast, benefits in the United States are gener-
ally a matter of private concern, provided only at the discretion of
employers.1 " The United States thus remains one of the few ad-
vanced industrialized nations that has no national health insur-
ance, no national maternity or parental leave policies, and no na-
tional legislation mandating job-protected leaves at the time of
childbirth. 14
Deep-rooted respect for the freedom of contract may explain
why the United States has not enacted a comprehensive national
leave policy. 5 However, case studies of European legislation also
suggest that differences in societal attitudes towards (1) maternity/
childcare benefits and (2) sexual equality may account for the pau-
city of childcare legislation in the United States." For example,
with respect to maternity, many European nations actively en-
courage families to have and raise children,1" whereas the United
States has traditionally viewed procreation and childrearing as
Presumably, women use disability or unpaid leave time to care for the newborn and
to recuperate from childbirth. Note, 73 Va L Rev at 1149-50 (cited in note 7).
12 See, generally, Joseph P. Allen, European Infant Care Leaves: Foreign Perspectives
on the Integration of Work and Family Roles, in Edward F. Zigler and Meryl Frank, eds,
The Parental Leave Crisis 245 (Yale U Press, 1988).
13 Kamerman, Maternity and Parenting Benefits: An International Overview at 235
(cited in note 7). At least thirteen states, however, are considering comprehensive parental
leave policies. Piccirillo, Legal Background of a Parental Leave Policy at 305 (cited in note
10). Four states (Montana, California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut) have statutes re-
quiring employers to provide job-protected, unpaid disability leave to pregnant employees.
Id at 307. The California and Montana provisions have been upheld against sex discrimina-
tion challenges based on the PDA. See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra
("Cal Fed"), 479 US 272 (1987); The Miller-Wohl Co. v Commissioner of Labor and Indus-
try, 214 Mont 238, 692 P2d 1243 (1984), vacated 479 US 1050 (1987) (vacated in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Cal Fed).
" President Bush vetoed the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990 in July 1990. The
Act would have entitled employees to job protection and to continuation of benefits, but not
to income replacement, for leave of up to twelve weeks, taken to care for a newborn or
adopted child, or a spouse or parent who has a serious medical condition. See Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1990, HR 770, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (1989). Both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate have reintroduced similar bills. See Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1991, HR 2, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991); S 5, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991).
" See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, Pub Papers Pres (June 29, 1990).
16 Allen, European Infant Care Leaves at 247-70 (cited in note 12).
' Id at 266-68. In most European nations, leaves have been justified by reference to
their positive effect on birthrates. Id at 267. In a study of European attitudes toward infant
care leaves, the most frequent explanation for why leaves are offered to parents is: "It's in
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matters of private concern, rather than as activities that it should
encourage. 18 With respect to sexual equality, Sweden's approach to
infant care1" is also illustrative of the European philosophy.20 In-
deed, Sweden has one of the most generous and flexible childcare
policies in Europe; it allows either parent to choose from among a
wide variety of leave options.2
Europeans also seem committed to improving sexual equality
at the Community level. The EC Council has approved a Recom-
mendation on childcare 22 that requires Member States to develop
measures to reconcile parents' often conflicting occupational and
familial obligations.23 More particularly, the Recommendation di-
rects Member States to develop measures designed to provide: (1)
private and public childcare centers for working parents;24 (2) flexi-
ble leave provisions that allow all working parents to take childcare
leave;2 5 and (3) workplace environments that are hospitable to
working parents with childrearing responsibilities. 26 Finally, the
-Recommendation requires Member States to "promote and en-
courage" increased participation by men in childrearing "in order
to achieve a more equal sharing of parental responsibilities be-
tween men and women. '27
the best interest of society to support families and parenthood in whatever way possible."
Id.
IA Allen, European Infant Care Leaves at 267 (cited in note 12). European nations also
seem to share a view of the family as the childrearing agent of choice and, therefore, may
have a stronger interest in preserving traditional family structures. Id at 268. Thus, Euro-
pean parents have expressed strong beliefs that they need to be with their children in the
first few months following birth. Id at 266. Accordingly, they believe that leave time helps
facilitate parent-child bonding that is critical to children's healthy development. Id at 268.
These beliefs have manifested themselves most conspicuously in the social legislation that
many European nations have enacted.
"9 Sweden's parental-leave law resulted from a decade of examining possible means of
promoting equality between men and women, and the Swedes have heralded the law as an
important step towards this goal. Allen, European Infant Care Leaves at 249 (cited in note
12). Thus far, however, the policy's equality-promoting effect has been largely symbolic;
men have used only two percent of the total parental leave days taken in Sweden. Id.
20 Id at 247.
Id at 247-48.
22 Commission Prop for a Council Rec on Childcare, 1991 OJ C242:3 ("Childcare Rec-
ommendation"). On December 3, 1991, the Council informally approved the Recommenda-
tion. Commission of the European Communities, Info-92, Jan 15, 1992 (LEXIS, Europe Li-
brary, Alleur File).
3 Childcare Recommendation, art 1, 1991 OJ at C242:4 (cited in note 22).
24 Id, art 3, 1991 OJ at C242:4.
2 Id, art 4, 1991 OJ at C242:5.
2" Id, art 5, 1991 OJ at C242:5.
2 Childcare Recommendation, art 6, 1991 OJ at C242:5 (cited in note 22).
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The Childcare Recommendation evinces a Community belief
that making it possible for both men and women to bear responsi-
bility for childrearing is a precondition for sexual equality. 8 Thus,
the Commission has proposed a Directive that would require Mem-
ber States to extend childcare leave to fathers, adoptive parents,
and step-parents. 9
The Economic and Social Committee has even suggested that
the Equal Treatment Directive might require extending childcare
leave to fathers.3 0 However, in Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Er-
satzkasse,31 the ECJ expressly rejected the notion that the ETD
was designed "to alter the division of responsibility between par-
ents."3 Yet, the ECJ left unexplained why it interpreted the ETD
to frustrate an individual family's choice as to which parent should
bear responsibility for childcare.
II. THE EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE AND THE PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty requires equal pay for men and
women for "equal work."33 The ETD enlarged the principle of
equal pay to require employers to treat male and female employees
equally.34 Equal treatment forbids all discrimination based on gen-
" See id, preamble, 1991 OJ at C242:3. The proposal for the Childcare Recommenda-
tion was the Commission's first measure under the "third (1991-1995) medium-term action
program" to promote equal opportunities between men and women. The primary goal of
this program is to promote the full participation of women in the labor market. Euroscope:
Social Affairs, Jan 30, 1992 (LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurscp File).
11 Commission Prop for a Council Dir on Parental Leave and Leave for Family Rea-
sons, 1983 OJ C333:6 (as amended by 1984 OJ C316:7). The Commission proposed the Di-
rective "to ensure respect in [the childcare] area for the principles of equal treatment laid
down in [the Equal Treatment Directive]." Id at 1983 OJ C333:6. Both the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee approved the Directive on similar grounds.
See European Parliament Opinion on Parental Leave Dir, 1984 OJ C117:180; Economic and
Social Committee Opinion on the Prop for a Council Dir on Parental Leave and Leave for
Family Reasons, 1984 OJ C206:47.
30 Opinion on the Prop for a Council Dir on Parental Leave and Leave for Family Rea-
sons, 1984 OJ C206:47 ("The Committee accepts that some legal homogeneity as proposed
by the Commission is desirable, more particularly in order to comply with existing Commu-
nity law on equal treatment of men and women."). To date the Council has not passed the
Directive. Euroscope: Social Affairs, Sept 26, 1991 (LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurscp File).
", Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR 3047, 1986:1 CMLR
242.
3 Id, 1984 ECR at 3075, 1986:1 CMLR at 264.
11 Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Art 119. Council Dir 75/117, 1975 OJ L45:19, requires
Member States to implement Article 119 and extends it to cases of equal pay for work of
equal value.
14 Council Dir 76/207, 1976 OJ at L39:40 (cited in note 3).
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der, marriage, or family status.3" The Directive requires Member
States to implement this principle with respect to "access to em-
ployment," "vocational training," and "working conditions."3 6 Be-
cause the term "working conditions" includes, policies governing
childcare benefits, equal treatment would seem to require equal ac-
cess to childcare leave benefits.3 7 Nevertheless, the ECJ has deter-
mined that Member States may deny fathers childcare leave even
if they extend to mothers a right to such benefits.
The United States counterpart to the ETD is Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from discrimi-
nating on the basis of gender.3 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978 ("PDA") amended Title VII to forbid discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy. 39 It makes clear that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions con-
stitutes the kind of gender discrimination that Title VII
prohibits. °
The PDA, like the rest of Title VII, is a nondiscrimination
provision: it requires employers to treat pregnancy the same as
they treat any other physical disability similarly affecting employ-
ment.4 ' Therefore, the PDA prohibits both imposed pregnancy
leave and termination of physically-able, pregnant women, and it
requires that women who are unable to work because of their preg-
31 Id, art 2(1), 1976 OJ at L39:40. See note 4.
" Id, art 1(1), 1976 OJ at L39:40. See note 4. Council Directive 79/7, 1979 OJ L6:24,
and Council Directive 86/378, 1986 OJ L225:40, extend equal treatment to public social se-
curity and occupational social security, respectively.
"' Council Dir 76/207, art 5(1), 1976 OJ at L39:41 (cited in note 3). The ECJ has taken
for granted that "working conditions," as defined in article 5(1), include leave policies. Case
163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, 1983 ECR 3273.
Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR 3047, 1986:1 CMLR 242.
38 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
" See 42 USC § 2000e-2 (1988). Before Congress passed the PDA, Title VII and the
Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid pregnancy discrimination. See General Electric Co. v
Gilbert, 429 US 125, 139-40 (1976) (discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not con-
stitute sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII); Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484
(1974) (pregnancy discrimination does not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
40 42 USC § 2000e(k) (1988) provides, in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work.
Piccirillo, Legal Background of a Parental Leave Policy at 302-305 (cited in note 10).
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nancy receive the same sick pay, insurance coverage, and job pro-
tection as other disabled employees.4 2
The PDA does not redress all the employment disadvantages
that pregnant workers face."3 First, because it does not expressly
require employers to provide disability leave or other benefits to
any employees, the PDA does not require employers to provide
benefits to pregnant workers." Employers with inadequate leave
policies may maintain such policies as long as they apply them
equally to all workers. Second, the PDA addresses pregnancy only
as a physical, medical condition. 41 To the extent that employers
provide disability leave, they need only extend leave to pregnant
workers during the period of actual physical disability caused by
pregnancy or childbirth-typically between four and eight weeks. 6
In fact, employers have argued that the PDA actually prohib-
its states from requiring employers to provide pregnancy leave be-
cause such laws discriminate against men.47 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this argument in California Federal Savings &
Loan Association v Guerra. s It held that a state may require preg-
nancy leave if it is confined to the period of physical disability. 9
The Court left unresolved the question of whether the PDA per-
mits states to require benefits for those physically disabled by
pregnancy while not requiring similar benefits for those who suffer
from other similar physical disabilities. Even if the Supreme Court
eventually addresses this issue," it is unlikely to allow states to
4 Id at 302-303.
4 Id at 303. However, Piccirillo suggests that the PDA has improved women's work
environment: "Because employers are not allowed to assume that pregnancy will interfere
with a woman's employment, a more equitable atmosphere exists in the workplace toward
pregnant workers and pregnancy-related leave." Id at 304.
" Id at 303.
" Piccirillo, Legal Background of a Parental Leave Policy at 303 (cited in note 10).
46 Id.
" California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US 272, 279 (1987); The
Miller-Wohl Co. v Commissioner of Labor and Industry, 214 Mont 238, 692 P2d 1243, 1248
(1984), vacated 479 US 1050 (1987) (vacated in light of the Supreme Court decision in Cal
Fed).
48 479 US 272 (1987).
49 Id at 292.
" Some language in the Cal Fed decision supports the conclusion that the Court would
decide this issue in the affirmative. First, the Court spoke loosely in terms of "special treat-
ment" and "special accommodation of pregnancy." Second, at one point the Court charac-
terized the issue for decision as "whether the PDA prohibits the States from requiring em-
ployers to provide reinstatement to pregnant workers, regardless of their policy for disabled
workers generally." Id at 283-84.
Equally plausibly, the Court may have used "special" in the limited sense that only
women can be entitled to pregnancy leave, because men cannot be disabled on account of
497]
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distinguish between male and female recipients of childcare bene-
fits. Indeed, the Third Circuit, relying on the implicit Cal Fed dis-
tinction between pregnancy disability leave and childcare leave,
has held that the PDA forbids employers from granting childcare
leave only to mothers.51
In contrast to the PDA, the Equal Treatment Directive ex-
pressly favors extending special pregnancy and maternity leave
benefits to women-even where men have no comparable leave
benefits. Indeed, by exempting "provisions concerning the protec-
tion of women" from the ETD's requirement of equal treatment, 2
Article 2(3) authorizes Member States to require employers to pro-
vide childbirth and childcare leave benefits exclusively to women.5 3
Whereas the PDA authorizes benefits on account of "preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," 4 ETD article
2(3) authorizes benefits on account of "pregnancy and mater-
nity."5 By singling out pregnancy and childcare for special treat-
ment, article 2(3) protects and affirms European societal attitudes
towards pregnancy and childcare benefits. Conversely, the nondis-
crimination provisions of Title VII, inasmuch as they treat preg-
nancy no differently than any other medical conditions, reflect a
commitment to gender-blind legislation in the name of equal
treatment.
pregnancy. And the Court may have characterized the issue in those terms precisely to indi-
cate an intent to limit the decision to the sole question of whether states may require preg-
nancy leave benefits.
But note that even if the Court did use "special" in that limited sense, it could still
decide the question affirmatively by fashioning an argument, contrary to Gilbert, that grant-
ing pregnancy disability leave but denying other disability leaves does not constitute prefer-
ential treatment.
"1 Schafer v Board of Public Educ., 903 F2d 243, 248 (3d Cir 1990). The distinction
between pregnancy and childcare is crucial to an understanding of the Schafer decision. The
Schafer court apparently felt that Cal Fed legitimated pregnancy as a legally-relevant dif-
ference justifying preferential treatment. Schafer, 903 F2d at 248. Thus, the Schafer court
rested its decision upon its conclusion that childrearing ability is not a legally-relevant dif-
ference between the sexes.
2 Council Dir 76/207, art 2(3), 1976 OJ at L39:40 (cited in note 3). See note 5.
" Case 163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, 1983
ECR 3273; Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR 3047, 1986:1
CMLR 242.
51 42 USC § 2000e(k).
"6 Council Dir 76/207, art 2(3), 1976 OJ at L39:40 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
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III. THE AMERICAN FEMINIST RESPONSE: THE EQUAL TREATMENT
MODEL OF SEXUAL EQUALITY
In the United States, feminist legal theory has been primarily
reactive, deriving inspiration from the development and success of
racial equality theory.56 The traditional equal protection model of
racial equality holds that physical differences among races can
never be legally significant.5 7 Accordingly, early feminist theory
stated that courts should treat gender like race: most physical dif-
ferences between men and women should not be accorded legal sig-
nificance. This equal treatment approach does, however, allow
courts to take legal cognizance of certain differences between men
and women.58
Because they initially embraced the equal treatment approach,
nearly all feminists lobbied for and supported the PDA as a benefi-
cial tool for combatting discrimination. However, when an em-
ployer invoked the PDA in Miller-Wohl v Commissioner of Labor
& Industry, arguing that pregnancy leave laws discriminated
against men,59 the feminist community was divided as to the
proper outcome. As a result, a number of feminists rejected the
equal treatment approach, contending that pregnancy is a signifi-
cant difference that justifies special legal treatment.60
The disagreement between the equal and special treatment
approaches is largely strategic. All feminists continue to share a
common goal: restructuring the workplace to allow either parent to
assume responsibility for childrearing so that women can compete
on an equal basis with men, thereby assuring women that "preg-
16 Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal L Rev 1279, 1291
(1987). See also, Herma Hill Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination 183-185, 566-572 (West, 1988).
"' Most notably, in Brown v Board of Educ., 347 US 483 (1954), the Supreme Court
reasoned that skin color is not a legally-sufficient basis for differential treatment.
" The equal treatment approach does not claim that all physical differences are legally
insignificant. For example, although Title VII is a nondiscrimination provision, it makes an
exception for bona fide occupational qualifications "reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of that particular business or enterprise." 42 USC § 2000e-2(e). Thus, a woman can-
not complain that she was discriminated against simply because she was not given the part
of Rhett Butler.
" Miller-Wohl, 692 P2d at 1253.
'0 This split has given rise to the so-called equal treatment/special treatment debate.
The debate owes its name to Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: The Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 325 (1984-85). The label
"special treatment" is misleading. Some American feminists have rejected the equal treat-
ment approach altogether. See note 75. In the context of the equal treatment/special treat-
ment debate, however, "special treatment" feminists are feminists who support the equal
treatment approach generally but make a narrow exception for pregnancy and other biologi-
cal differences.
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nancy will not hinder their achievements."61 Thus, feminists disa-
gree only as to the means by which their goal should be achieved.
Advocates of the equal treatment approach suggest that the
law should treat pregnancy and recovery from childbirth the same
as any other temporary physical disability that prevents an em-
ployee from working."' Courts should not recognize pregnancy as a
legally relevant difference. Rather, they should simply ensure that
benefits are made equally available to all similarly situated, dis-
abled workers."
Special treatment advocates respond that pregnancy imposes
unique burdens on women that similarly situated men do not face.
Therefore, courts should recognize pregnancy as a legally signifi-
cant difference." Assuring equal opportunities for women in the
workplace requires special treatment of pregnancy." Thus, courts
should uphold provisions singling out pregnancy for favorable
treatment."
The danger implicit in the special treatment approach is that
it may encourage a return to the condescendingly paternalistic,
"separate-spheres" approach. 7 Indeed, there is good historical evi-
dence to suggest that according legal significance to gender roles
e Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 Berkeley
Women's L J 1, 34-35 (1985).
62 Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 327 (cited in note 60).
63 See, for example, Brief for the National Organization of Women as amici curiae, Cal-
ifornia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US 272 (1987) (No. 85-494) (Wendy W.
Williams, Of Counsel).
64 Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L J at 35 (cited in note 61). In her response to Professor
Williams, Professor Kay calls for an "episodic analysis" that ignores biological differences
except during the time a female is actually pregnant. See Herma Hill Kay, Models of Equal-
ity, 1985 U Ill L Rev 39, 77-78 (confining biological differences to "immutable sex differ-
ences," most notably, pregnancy).
For other defenses of special treatment of pregnancy, see Linda J. Krieger and Patricia
N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the
Meaning of Woman's Equality, 13 Golden Gate U L Rev 513 (1983) (criticizing equal treat-
ment of pregnancy for failing to acknowledge real sex differences); Sylvia A. Law, Rethink-
ing Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955, 1007-13 (1984) (calling for equal treat-
ment in all areas except reproduction).
66 Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L J at 34 (cited in note 61).
6 See, for example, Brief for Equal Rights Advocates as amici curiae, California Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US 272 (1987) (No. 85-494) (Herma Hill Kay, Of
Counsel).
67 Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 352-74 (cited in note 60). The ideology of
"separate spheres" promoted division of the world into two separate spheres, one public and
one private. Men inhabited the public world of commerce and politics; women, the private
sphere of family and home. See also, Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US (16 Wall) 130, 141 (1872)
("the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman").
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has often resulted in the exclusion of women from the workplace.6 8
Thus, equal treatment advocates argue that special treatment of
pregnancy may actually perpetuate workplace inequality by rein-
forcing the "separate-spheres" notion that a woman's primary role
is that of a mother, not a worker. 9 However, a clearly drawn ex-
ception for pregnancy might avoid the dangers of reintroducing
gender-based distinctions.7 °
Both equal and special treatment advocates reject legally rec-
ognizing differences based on archaic and stereotypical views of
gender roles. More particularly, they reject stereotypes that sug-
gest a mother is more naturally and inevitably equipped to care for
children.7' Both place equal responsibility for childrearing on
mothers and fathers.72 Most importantly, both recognize that dis-
tinguishing childrearing ability from childbearing capacity is essen-
tial to achieving equality in the workplace. To collapse the two into
one may result in rules that perpetuate disadvantageous stereo-
e For example, in Muller v Oregon, 208 US .412 (1908), the Court upheld an Oregon
statute that limited women's work hours. The Court reasoned that, because women are
physically different from men, special treatment was required in order to "secure a real
equality of right." Id at 421. See, generally, Judith A. Baer, The Chains of Protection: The
Judicial Response to Women's Labor Legislation (Greenwood Press, 1978).
69 Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 371 (cited in note 60). Professor Christine
Littleton has noted that it is not surprising that "the spectre of a return to separate spheres
ideology looms so large in any discussion of what feminists do on behalf of women." Lit-
tleton, 75 Cal L Rev at 1291 (cited in note 56). Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the
"fact" that a woman is regarded as the center of home and family life as recently as 1961.
Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57, 62 (1961).
70 Kay, 1 Berkeley's Women L J at 34 (cited in note 61).
Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 355 n 119 (cited in note 60), quoting Law,
132 U Pa L Rev at 988-89 (cited in note 64):
In taking responsibility for children, women act as independent moral agents.
When the Supreme Court assumes that biology dictates that women care for in-
fants, it is impossible to attach moral value to the woman's action or to acknowl-
edge the human and social worth of the nurturing that women do. When the
Court allows sex-based classifications to be justified by the presumption that fa-
thers are unidentified, absent, and irresponsible, it is more likely that these gener-
alizations will continue to be true.
" Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 354 n 115 (cited in note 60), quoting
Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, Childbirth and Child Rearing Leave: Job-Related Benefits, 17 N
Y Legal F 480, 481 (1971):
The conceptual framework of childbearing and childrearing fits both present and
future reality better than a conceptual framework that assumes that childbearing
and childrearing are both solely the responsibility of women. The young women
feminists insist, quite logically, that assumption by men of a full share in the rear-
ing of children would contribute to the welfare of the whole family.
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types and that discourage parents from opting for non-traditional
allocations of childrearing responsibility. 73
In summary, because the equal treatment approach distin-
guishes between childrearing ability and childbearing capacity, it
insists that courts independently analyze childcare and pregnancy
benefits. Special treatment objections emerge only with respect to
judicial consideration of pregnancy-related disability. Thus, both
special and equal treatment advocates agree that those who under-
take to provide childcare leave should make it equally available to
both parents.7 4 Making such leave available only to mothers consti-
tutes sex discrimination.75
" Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 354 (cited in note 60); Kay, 1 Berkeley
Women's L J at 34 (cited in note 61).
7" "There appears to be unanimity in feminist legal circles that childrearing (infant
care) leaves should be available to parents of either sex. The dispute . . . is limited to how
to treat pregnancy." Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 354 n 116 (cited in note 60).
" Until recently, the feminist debate over the proper treatment of pregnancy has taken
place solely within the traditional equal treatment approach to sexual equality. In turn, this
debate has spawned a variety of feminist responses that reject traditional equality theory.
Each of these non-traditional approaches attempts to redefine equality "to respond directly
to the concrete and lived-out experience of women." Littleton, 75 Cal L Rev at 1300 (cited
in note 56). Accordingly, they focus not on the source of gender differences, but on the
consequences of gender differences. These approaches allow different treatment of men and
women whenever the different treatment promotes the goal of ending women's subordina-
tion. For example, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women
(Yale U Press, 1979) ("inequality approach" rejects difference as relevant inquiry and fo-
cuses directly on subordination and domination; if a policy subordinates women it violates
equality, if it empowers women it enhances equality); Littleton, 75 Cal L Rev at 1312, 1323-
32 ("equality as acceptance" model rejects the distinction between biological and cultural
differences; the function of equality is to make gender differences, perceived or actual,
costless relative to each other). See also, Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Juris-
prudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L J 1373 (1986) (rejecting the equal treatment model and
accepting MacKinnon's "inequality approach"); Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking
Sex Differences into Account, 54 Fordham L Rev 699 (1986); Lucinda M. Finley, Tran-
scending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
Colum L Rev 1118 (1986).
Under these non-traditional models of sexual equality, special treatment of pregnancy
is permissible because it promotes equality in the workplace. See, for example, Brief for the
Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace (CREW) as amici curiae, California
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US 272 (1987) (No 85-494) (Christine A. Lit-
tleton, Attorney of Record). Moreover, because equality theory does not focus on the source
of difference, special treatment in connection with childcare is not necessarily impermissi-
ble: "[Ilf women currently tend to assume primary responsibility for childrearing, we should
not ignore that fact in an attempt to prefigure the rosy day when parenting is fully shared."
Littleton, 75 Cal L Rev at 1297 (cited in note 60).
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IV. UNITED STATES AND EC JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO PREGNANCY
LEAVE POLICIES
A. The United States Judicial Response
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v Guerra,
an employee took pregnancy disability leave from work. When she
was ready to return to work three months later, the bank told her
that she had been replaced and that no similar positions were
available. California law, however, required employers to give
pregnancy-related, disabled employees temporary unpaid leave of
up to four months, with guaranteed reinstatement in their original
job or its equivalent.7 7 California Federal claimed that California
law violated the PDA because it did not afford similar protection
to non-pregnancy-related, disabled employees.7 8 The Court dis-
agreed and held the California statute valid on the ground that it
promoted equal employment opportunity.7 9
The Supreme Court explained that, subject to certain limita-
tions, Congress intended the PDA to be a "floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above
which they may not rise. ''80 The PDA and the California statute
share a common goal: "to achieve equality of employment opportu-
nities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor
an identifiable group of . . .employees over other employees.""'
76 California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US at 278.
7 Cal Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980) provided, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide occu-
pational qualification: ...
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or other related medical conditions ....
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; pro-
vided, such period shall not exceed four months .... Reasonable period of time
means that period during which the female employee is disabled on account of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ....
California's Fair Employment and Housing Commission had construed § 12945(b)(2) to re-
quire California employers to reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to
her original job or its equivalent. California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479
US at 276.
71 California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US at 279.
"' Id at 289. In addition, the Court emphasized that the California statute was "nar-
rowly drawn to cover only the period of actual disability on account of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions." Id at 290. Employees taking leave were not automati-
cally given four months. Rather, employees were only permitted the period of actual
disability due to pregnancy for their recovery, up to four months. Id.
80 California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US at 285, quoting Califor-
nia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v Guerra, 758 F2d 390, 396 (9th Cir 1985).
" Id at 288, quoting Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424, 429-30 (1971).
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The California statute promotes equal employment opportunity by
"guarantee[ing] women the basic right to participate fully and
equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental
right to full participation in family life."82 In other words, it allows
women, like men, to procreate without having to sacrifice their
jobs. At the same time, the Court cautioned that the PDA does not
permit unequal treatment animated by "archaic or stereotypical
notions about pregnancy and the abilities of pregnant workers." 83
Presumably, both women and men can challenge the legality
of unequal treatment grounded in stereotypical assumptions. For
example, women can attack maternity leave policies that require
them to leave work at a certain point in their pregnancy, because
such a requirement is based on stereotypes concerning the capaci-
ties of pregnant women. 4 Similarly, men can attack a mothers-
only policy that extends leave beyond the period of physical disa-
bility, because such a policy is based on anachronistic assumptions
about the childrearing abilities of fathers."'
Indeed, Schafer v Board of Public Education86 addressed just
such an issue. In this case, a male teacher challenged a collective
bargaining agreement that made a one-year maternity leave availa-
ble only to female teachers.8 7 The Third Circuit found no evidence
in the record to suggest that the physical disability due to "preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" extended to one
year.88 Therefore, the court distinguished this leave policy from the
pure disability leave statute upheld in California Federal Savings
& Loan Association v Guerra, and it ruled that the PDA does not
allow "preferential treatment to employees who have recently
given birth to a child without a simultaneous showing of a continu-
ing disability related to either the pregnancy or to the delivery of
the child."' 9 Such agreements violate Title VII and are "void for
any leave granted beyond the period of actual disability on account
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."9
82 Id at 289, quoting 123 Cong Rec 29658 (Sept 6, 1977).
83 Id at 290.
Mary Piccirillo, Legal Background of a Parental Leave Policy at 308 (cited in note
10).
86 Id.
80 Schafer v Board of Public Educ., 903 F2d 243 (3d Cir 1990).
87 Id at 245.
88 Id at 248.
89 Id.
88 Schafer v Board of Public Educ., 903 F2d at 248.
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Thus, embracing the equal treatment approach, the Third Cir-
cuit held that no legally-relevant difference exists between the
sexes with respect to ability to care for children. Childcare leave
policies must make benefits equally available to both mothers and
fathers in order to comply with Title VII.
B. The EC Judicial Response
The ECJ has reached the opposite result. In Commission of
the European Communities v Italian Republic, the ECJ upheld a
national law establishing mothers-only childcare leave.91 In this
case, at issue was the validity of an Italian statute that granted,
only to adoptive mothers, maternity leave and benefits for three
months immediately following adoption.2 The ECJ upheld the
statute without, as required by article 2(3) of the ETD, explaining
how adoption leave protects the mother. The ECJ seemed to up-
hold the statute on the ground that it protects the child. Limiting
eligibility to adoptive mothers was justified by the "legitimate con-
cern to assimilate as far as possible to conditions of entry of the
child into the adoptive family to those of the arrival of a newborn
child in the family during the very delicate initial period."93
If the ECJ upheld the statute solely because it was designed to
protect the child, its decision is clearly wrong under the Equal
Treatment Directive. The ETD requires equal adoption leave for
mothers and fathers, unless such leave is designed to protect the
mother." Concern for the child's welfare cannot justify restricting
eligibility to adoptive mothers. Further, adoption leave, unlike
pregnancy disability leave, clearly cannot be justified by reference
to the physical needs of the mother." However, the ECJ's Ulrich
"' Case 163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, 1983
ECR 3273.
92 Law No 903 of 1977, art 6.
" Case 163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, 1983
ECR at 3288.
" The statutory language alone supports this conclusion. Article 2(3) exempts only
"provisions concerning the protection of women" from the ETD requirement of equal treat-
ment. In addition, the Advocate-General has stated that a maternity leave provision either
is a "provision concerning the.protection of women," or it is designed to protect the child, in
which case the statute discriminates against men, since both mother and father can protect
the child. Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR 3047, 3082,
1986:1 CMLR 242, 251.
" The Advocate-General also concluded that adoption leave does not protect the adop-
tive mother in connection with maternity:
I believe that leave after giving birth to a child in order to allow the mother to rest
may rightly be regarded as a provision to protect women in relation to maternity.
On the other hand, I consider that leave after adoption benefits the child above all
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Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkassel" decision may save its Italian Re-
public holding, because in this case the ECJ held that childcare
leave does protect the mother.9 7
In Hofmann, a German worker took an unpaid leave of ab-
sence in order to care for his newborn child so that his wife could
resume her employment. As required by law, Mrs. Hofmann took
convalescence leave from work for the eight weeks immediately fol-
lowing childbirth. 8 The German Government also encouraged
working mothers to take four additional months of leave by paying
a maternity allowance equal to the mother's salary.9 Since the
Hofmanns decided that Mr. Hofmann should take the additional
leave, he submitted a claim for the maternity allowance. The Ger-
man Government denied his claim on the ground that only work-
ing mothers were eligible for benefits.100 The ECJ affirmed the
German Government's denial of Mr. Hofmann's claim. 10 1
In contrast to its decision in Italian Republic, the ECJ at-
tempted to fit the German statute within the meaning of article
2(3) of the ETD. According to the ECJ, childcare leave protects
the mother because "only the mother [] may find herself subject to
undesirable pressures to return to work prematurely. '" 102 The ECJ
explained that:
[I]t is legitimate to protect the special relationship be-
tween a woman and her child over the period which fol-
lows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that rela-
tionship from being disturbed by multiple burdens which
would result from the simultaneous pursuit of
employment. .. 3
in so far as it is intended to foster the emotional ties necessary to settle the child
in the family adopting it.
Case 163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, 1983 ECR at
3297. Accordingly, she concluded that adoption leave must be granted to adoptive fathers on
the same basis as adoptive mothers. Id at 3298.
" Case 184/83, 1984 ECR 3047, 1986:1 CMLR 242.
" Id, 1984 ECR at 3075, 1986:1 CMLR at 264.
98 German Law for the Protection of Working Mothers of April 18, 1968, § 6(1)
(Bundesgesetzblatt I at 315).
11 Id as amended by the Law of June 25, 1979, §§ 8(a) and 13 (Bundesgesetzblatt I at
797) (the substitute salary was subject to an upper limit).
"I0 Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR 3047, 3069, 1986:1
CMLR 242, 260.
Id, 1984 ECR at 3076, 1986:1 CMLR at 265.
102 Id, 1984 ECR at 3075, 1986:1 CMLR at 265.
loS Id, 1984 ECR at 3075, 1986:1 CMLR at 264-65.
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As an historical matter, the ECJ's premise is no doubt correct; tra-
ditionally, both childcare and childbirth have disproportionately
burdened mothers and have often made employment and mother-
hood incompatible pursuits. But the premise smacks of "archaic
and stereotypical notions about pregnancy" 10' that historically
have "protected" women to their disadvantage.10 5
Although the ETD permits Member States to require the pro-
vision of pregnancy and childcare leave,106 it, like the PDA, should
not be interpreted to permit differential treatment where such
treatment is based on a perceived difference in the ability of each
sex to care for children. 10 7 Indeed, the Advocate-General implicitly
supported this view by noting that article 2(3) requires not only
that the difference in treatment seek to protect the preferentially-
treated sex, but that it must also seek to protect it for an objective
reason.108 The ECJ lacked such. an objective reason and it simply
failed to distinguish between childbearing capacity and childrear-
ing ability. The former is an innate physiological trait, the latter is
104 California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US at 290.
100 See notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, both Professor Williams
and Professor Kay have rejected the ECJ premise as a valid justification for unequal child-
care leave policies:
[This premise] does describe the reality of many women's lives, but it also as-
sumes the inevitability of that reality and, more deeply, the desirability of tradi-
tional family roles for women .... It is designed to provide unquestionably
needed help to assist women in coping with dual responsibilities. The problem is,
[this] approach not only gives recognition to one type of family structure, it ac-
tively discourages and thwarts alternative models. It ensures the continuance of
women's dual burden.
Williams, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 377 (cited in note 60). Professor Kay, agreeing
with Professor Williams, rejected the rationale in Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L J at 34 n 173
(cited in note 61).
1o Council Dir 76/207, art 2(3), 1976 OJ at L39:40 (cited in note 3).
10' Of course, the ETD does not require that any particular preferential treatment of
women be the best means for protecting women. Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer
Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR at 3075, 1986:1 CMLR at 264. The legal opinion of the Advocate-
General supports the ECJ in this regard:
It is sufficient that the national measure which confers an advantage on women in
connection with employment should seek to protect them for an objective reason.
It is the relationship between its aim (namely, protection) and the objective rea-
son determining that aim (pregnancy or maternity, for example) which justifies
the measure, not the absence of alternatives.
Id, 1984 ECR at 3083, 1986:1 CMLR at 253.
'1o Id, 1984 ECR at 3083-84, 1986:1 CMLR at 253. The Advocate-General argued for
upholding the statute on the ground that the additional leave protected the mother's health
by allowing her to recover more fully. While the Advocate-General's rationale comports with
the ETD as a matter of law, it will not always comport with the facts. See; for example, the
facts in Schafer v Board of Public Educ., 903 F2d 243 (3d Cir 1990) (one year pregnancy
leave not necessary to protect mother's health).
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not. Consequently, the ECJ effectively emasculated article 2(3)'s
"protection of women" requirement.
Further, the German statute may not alleviate the "undesir-
able pressures to return to work prematurely." If the statute seeks
to protect mothers from the "multiple burdens" imposed by moth-
erhood and employment, then shifting childrearing responsibilities
to fathers may be necessary. Lengthening the leave period beyond
the disability period does not reduce multiple burdens; it merely
postpones undesirable pressures. However, giving the fathers the
option to take the childcare leave would help relieve women of
multiple burdens. 10 9
Although in Hofmann, the ECJ asserted that the ETD is not
designed to "settle questions concerning the organization of the
family, or to alter the division of responsibility between par-
ents," 110 the ECJ's interpretation of the ETD may in fact frustrate
voluntary, individual family choices as to which parent should bear
responsibility for rearing a child. Nations and employers should
not, by denying men childcare benefits, be permitted to discourage
families from vesting fathers with responsibility for childcare. Al-
though making childcare leave available only to women does not
prevent men from taking unpaid childcare leaves, it nonetheless
exerts subtle economic pressure on families to retain traditional
gender roles.1" '
Finally, the history of EC childcare legislation strongly sug-
gests that Community institutions believe that the ETD should be
interpreted to require making childcare benefits equally available
to both men and women. Only under such a regime can true equal-
ity of opportunity be achieved.
'09 Of course, even if the ECJ had held that gender-based childcare policies discrimi-
nate against fathers, Germany still would have had the right to choose the means by which
to eliminate that discrimination. Thus, Germany could have extended eligibility to fathers
or withdrawn optional leave from both mothers and fathers. Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v
Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 ECR at 3082, 1986:1 CMLR at 253 (Opinion of Advocate-Gen-
eral). However, given its comparatively strong commitment to childcare benefits for
mothers, Germany probably would have extended the benefits to fathers.
.1 Id, 1984 ECR at 3075, 1986:1 CMLR at 264.
... Of course, merely allowing paternity leave would not necessarily affect traditional
gender roles in the family. For example, although Sweden grants men paid childcare leave,
men have used only two percent of the total parental days taken in Sweden. Allen, Euro-
pean Infant Care Leaves at 249 (cited in note 12). Yet, to the extent that legal rules perpet-
uate stereotypical gender roles, they should be closely scrutinized. The fact that only two
percent of childcare days are taken by fathers does not mean that making such leave equally
available to men and women does not represent at least a symbolic victory.
[1992:
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CONCLUSION
The fact that European women generally fare better than
American women on equality issues cautions against exporting
United States legal approaches across the Atlantic. Nonetheless,
the United States experience strongly counsels against laws that
serve to perpetuate stereotypical gender roles. The equal treatment
approach has much to recommend it, and it requires employers to
make childcare leave equally available to both mothers and
fathers.
In the EC, the Hofmann decision emasculates the Equal
Treatment Directive's potential for promoting real sexual equality.
It may unintentionally perpetuate stereotypical assumptions about
the proper childrearing roles of mothers. and fathers. Only when
Member States and employers are required to make childcare ben-
efits equally available to both mothers and fathers will women gain
equality in the workplace.

